經濟與管理論叢(Journal of Economics and Management)  
  Volume 9, No. 2  
  July, 2013  
     
 

The Demographics of Cooperation: Evidence  from a Field Experiment in the Gori-Ganga Basin

 
   
 

Sujoy Chakravarty

 
  Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social Sciences, JNU, New Delhi and IMT Ghaziabad, India  
 

 

 

  Carine Sebi  
  Centre des Sciences Humaines,University of Grenoble, Delhi and  INRA-GAEL, India  
     
E. Somanathan
 

Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, India

 
     
  Emmanuel Theophilus  
  Himal Prakriti, India  
   

 

Abstract
 

The public goods problem (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a long history in the Social Sciences.Our experimental design uses a standard Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) game with a moderately large group of ten and face-to-face communication. The subjects, who are villagers in the Gori-Ganga Basin of the Central Himalayas, are not re-matched every period.Our results are somewhat different from laboratory experiments using a similar design such as Isaac and Walker (1988a, 1988b). A noteworthy general observation is that even with a relatively low Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR = 0.2) and a large group we find a steady contribution rate around 55 percent, which diminishes slightly at the end of the session to around 45 percent. We also delve into the demographic characteristics of our subject pool and find that individual contribution to the common pool is determined by gender, age, caste, literacy and history of cooperation in the experiment. However, face-to-face communication is not seen to increase average individual contribution to the common pool.

 

     
 

Keywords: voluntary contributions mechanism, field experiments, gender,

 

 

 caste, minority

 

JEL classification: C93, C72, H41, Q23

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